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Liability of Engineer for Defective Design
Emil F. Sos, Jr.*
T HE PRACTICE OF "PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING" in the United States is
governed by licensing statutes in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. Liability for incompetency is only indirectly affected by these
statutes. The statutes do have an effect on the contractual relationships
of the engineer and most states' make a violation of the licensing sections
a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. -
The impact of the statutes on the contractual relationship will be
explored first. Contracts concerned with professional services by an
unlicensed practitioner are generally held to be void. 3 There are two
groups of cases in which this principle applies. One is the case where
the hiring party wishes to avoid the contract,4 and the other, where the
unlicensed individual wishes to collect for services rendered and the de-
fendant uses the lack of a license as a defense to the contract action.5
The contract situation is summarized in Corpus Juris6 as follows:
Where a license or certificate is required by statute as a requisite
for one practicing a particular profession an agreement of a profes-
sional character without such license or certificate is ordinarily held
illegal and void. This is true, for example, of an agreement made by
an unlicensed or uncertified physician, an attorney at law, a convey-
ancer, an engineer, or a school teacher.
The Licensing Requirement
The license required by the state law does elevate, to some degree,
the level of competency necessary to practice "professional engineering."
The licensing statutes, besides the specific educational and experience
requirements, have two other provisions worth noting. In thirty-two
jurisdictions professional engineers may form corporations7 to practice
* B.S. in Industrial Engineering, Pennsylvania State Univ.; Third-year student at
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Project Engineer,
General Electric Co.
1 37 States make the violation a misdemeanor, and 14 indicate that a penalty is
attached to any violation.
2 The most common penalty being a fine of $500 and/or imprisonment not to exceed
90 days.
3 Some jurisdictions, for example Mo. Ann. Stat. § 327-260, specifically state that the
contract is void.
4 Fanning v. College of Steubenville, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 497, 197 N.E. 2d 457 (1961).
5 Wedgewood v. Jorgens, 190 Mich. 620, 157 N.W. 360 (1916); Norton v. Imperial
Realty Co., 133 Tenn. 681, 182 S.W. 230 (1916); Beecher v. Perry Fruit Co., 49 Ind.
App. 184, 97 N.E. 23 (1912); Perlitch v. Simmom, 150 N.Y.S. 695 (1914).
6 13 Corpus Juris 423.
7 For examples of such provisions see: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51-1-18; Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 471.06; Pa. Stat. Ann. § 63-153. For jurisdictions not allowing corporate prac-
tice see N.Y. Ed. Law § 7209; Ohio Rev. Code § 4733.16.
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engineering, providing one of the officers or the responsible individual
in charge is licensed. Under these statutes the officer or individual in
charge is liable for any incompetency of subordinates. Another item of
interest is the listing of exceptions to the licensing requirements by
eighteen jurisdictions8 for services provided by engineers solely for their
manufacturing company. 9 In essence, this exception allows the practice
of engineering without a license by a substantial number of engineers.
Neither of the above two provisions are common to the professional prac-
tice of medicine and law.
The effect of the licensing requirement on the level of competency
is explained by the New York Court in Brown v. Shyne'0 as follows:
Proper formulation of general standards of preliminary education
and proper examination of the particular applicant should serve to
raise the standard of skill and care generally possessed by members
of the profession in this state; but, the license to practice medicine
confers no additional skill upon the practitioner, nor does it confer
immunity from physical injury upon a patient if the practitioner fails
to exercise care.
The same reasoning used by the New York Court in the field of
medicine can find a parallel in the field of engineering. The level of
competence is raised by the requirements of the statute; however, the
liability for incompetency does not depend upon the presence or absence
of a "professional engineering" license.
The liability for incompetency is judged on the individual's perform-
ance, because the most competent, licensed practitioner can be negligent"
and the unlicensed practitioner can be most competent. 2
The New York Court in Brown v. Shyne13 states the purpose of the
medical license statute, which by analogy, as to purpose, can be applied
to the engineering statute as follows:
The purpose of the statute is to protect the public against unfounded
assumption of skill by one who undertakes to prescribe for or treat
disease. In order to show that the plaintiff has been injured by the
defendant's breach of the statutory duty proof must be given that
the defendant in such treatment did not exercise the care and skill
which would have been exercised by qualified practitioners within
8 For examples of the provision see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 89-12(8), Pa. Stat. Ann. § 63-
152 (f).
9 Although eighteen jurisdictions specifically state the exceptions, the remaining
jurisdictions allow the practice of engineering solely for manufacturing corporations.
10 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 198 (1926).
11 For a comparison between incompetence and negligence see 65 Corpus Juris
Secundum 451.
12 Brown v. Shyne, supra n. 10, at 199, "Even a skilled and learned practitioner who
is not licensed commits an offense against the state; but against such practitioner the
statute was not intended to protect, for no protection was needed, and neglect to ob-
tain a license results in no injury to the patient and therefore, no private wrong."
13 Supra n. 10, at 199.
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the state and that such lack of skill and care caused the injury. Fail-
ure to obtain a license as required by law gives rise to no remedy if
it has caused no injury.14
Before going on to the liability of the professional engineer, it may
be worth noting an Ohio case15 which speaks of the licensing statute and
the profession of engineering. An Ohio surveyor' was sued on a con-
tract for his professional services and pleaded as a defense the Statute
of Limitations for malpractice. The court disallowed the application of
the malpractice statute and stated:
It is obvious that engineering is a licensed profession in the layman's
use of the word profession, but nowhere does the law bring that
profession within the benefits or handicaps afforded law and medi-
cine in defining the extent to which the word malpractice may beinterpreted in a statute of limitations. It is the opinion of this Court
that the conduct complained of may be a breach of contract but,
cannot be construed as malpractice and, therefore, the one year
statute of limitations does not apply. 17
By implication the legislatures of at least two states disagree with
the Lower Ohio Court. The legislature of Florida states that "malprac-
tice" is a reason for revoking an engineer's license' 8 and, North Carolina
authorizes its Board of Engineering Examiners to determine the "charges
of malpractice." 19
The Engineer's Liability
Professor Bell's comment concerning the liability of architects and
engineers aptly describes the pre-1960 liability of this professional group
as follows:
Our Courts have erected a protective legal structure around
architects and engineers which has been sufficient at least in the past
to shelter members of those two professions from any extensive
liability for their misconduct. However, it would seem that this
legal structure was erected on an unfirm foundation and cracks are
appearing in the wall so that occasionally architects and engineers
have been held legally responsible for their errors. 20
14 Accord, Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936); Janssen v. Mulder, 232Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925); and, Willet v. Rowekamp, 134 O.S. 285, 16 N.E. 2d 457(1938) where the court cites Brown v. Shyne (supra n. 10) with approval and goes
on to state: "Failure to procure a license does not in itself give rise to any right of
recovery... but only subjects the defendant to the penalty prescribed by the statute.
'5 Wishnek v. Gufla, 67 Ohio Abs. 49, 114 N.E. 2d 914 (1953).
16 Surveyors and Engineer are covered by the same sections of the Ohio Rev. Code
§§ 4733.01 to .25 and 4733.99.
17 Wishnek v. Gulla, supra n. 15 at 52, 53, 114 N.E. 2d at 917.
18 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 471.26.
19 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 89-9.
20 Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 711( ).
Jan. 1970
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Approximately four years after Professor Bell's article appeared, the
Supreme Court of Alabama handed down a decision which serves to
widen the field of contractual liability for professional engineers. In
language usually associated with the sale of goods, the Court held a civil
engineering firm to "impliedly warrant the sufficiency and adequacy of
the plans and specifications to reasonably accomplish the purpose for
which they were intended .... ,, 21
The engineering firm was to design and specify a drainage system
for a subdivision. The plans and specifications did not provide what
amounted to adequate drainage and the plaintiff filed suit based on the
implied warranties of the contract for professional services. In the
court's opinion, it distinguishes the professional services in this case from
those of physicians, attorneys, and architects stating that in those pro-
fessions there are too many elements of judgment to be dealt with, there-
by negating any expectation of implied warranty.
The Alabama court reasons that the elements involved in the drain-
age survey are ascertainable to the point that it is reasonable and just
for a person to expect a specific result. Quoting the Court in part:
It is our opinion that an engineering survey of drainage require-
ments of a tract of land to be developed as a subdivision on which
dwellings are to be erected as here presented is not entailed with
unknown or uncontrollable topographical or landscape conditions as
would prevent a drainage survey if properly made with reasonable
skill and diligence by a qualified civil engineer, from being reason-
ably accurate by the proper use of instruments and known formulas
accepted and used by the civil engineering profession. Certainly a
contracting party has a right to expect the survey to be done with
reasonable accuracy chargeable to the profession and should not be
dependent in his efforts to recover damages on an allegation of
negligence or unskillful and imprudent work.
22
In holding the engineering firm to a warranty of a reasonable result,
the court relies upon the scientific certainties involved in the work of
making a drainage survey. This same principle of scientific certainty
could be applied with equal force to the architect who designs trusses,
23
the engineer who specifies pilings,24 or the surveyor who is to set
boundaries.25
With the engineering ability demonstrated in the space program,
perhaps the courts and the public will demand a higher standard of
21 Broyles et al. v. Brown Engineering Co., Inc., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767, 770
(1963).
22 Id. at 772.
23 For a contra holding on implied warranty see Audlane Lumber v. D. E. Britt &
Assoc., Inc., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. App. 1964).
24 Pittman Const. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 178 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1965).
25 Taft v. Rutherford, 66 Wash. 256, 119 P. 740 (1911). For examples of pleading of
negligence of engineers, see Oleck, Negligence Forms of Pleading, 556, 1068 (1957 rev.
ed.).
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performance from the engineering profession. The demands may be such
that a lack of negligence will no longer suffice to shelter the profession.
Perhaps one of the most recent developments in the liability of
engineers and architects is that of responsible supervision of the meth-
ods used by contractors. The Illinois Supreme Court in Miller et al. v.
DeWitt et al.26 held the architectural firm liable for injuries received by
the contractor's employees. The plaintiffs were injured when a gym-
nasium roof collapsed due to the inadequate shoring of trusses.
The contract between the school district and architects contained the
usual clauses in the standard form contract published by the American
Institute of Architects. 27 Generally, the clauses concerned with super-
vision have been construed to mean "that the general duty to 'supervise
the work' merely creates a duty to see that the building when con-
structed meets the plans and specifications contracted for." 28
The Illinois Court did not construe the form contract used by this
architectural firm in the manner previously followed. The Court rea-
soned that since the architect or engineer had the right to stop the work,
they had a corresponding duty to the plaintiffs to effect such a stoppage
if an unsafe condition was apparent or should have been apparent. 29
The plaintiffs' complaint charged two counts of common law negli-
gence:
(c)-Negligently and carelessly failed to oversee and inspect the
scaffolding as used to determine whether or not it was safe to use.
(d)-Otherwise negligently and carelessly failed to apply to the
work aforesaid the degree of skill which would customarily be
brought to such work by competent architects in and about this
community.30
In commenting on the duty and its breach by the architects, the
Court stated:
Here it appears that the shoring and removal of part of the old gym-
nasium roof was a major part of the entire remodeling operation and
one that involved obvious hazards. We think that the shoring oper-
ation was of such importance that the jury could find from the evi-
dence that the architects were guilty of negligence in failing to
inspect and watch over the shoring operation.31
The Miller case was first decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in
March of 1966 against recovery by the plaintiffs. The Court granted a
26 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E. 2d 630 (1967).
27 American Institute of Architects, Document No. A-201.
28 Day v. National United States Radiator, 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961); Garden
City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P. 2d 352 (1953); Clinton v. Boehm, 124
N.Y.S. 789, 139 App. Div. 73 (1910).
29 Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W. 2d 869 (1960).
30 Miller et al. v. DeWitt et al., supra n. 26, at 638.
31 Id. at 639.
Jan. 1970
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rehearing and the above opinion was handed down in January, 1967,
rehearing denied March 27, 1967. The Illinois Architectural Society in
an amicus curiae brief opposed liability on the negligent supervision of
the contractors methods basis. Engineers and architects normally have
not been responsible for the contractors methods; their primary respon-
sibility has been to assure conformity of the finished structure or build-
ing to the detailed plans and specifications.
This additional liability of the architect or engineer may add to the
ever increasing cost of construction as pointed out by Justice House in
his dissenting opinion. Quoting in part from the dissent:
Liability of architects as imposed here is economically unsound-
The huge construction industry in this country has functioned very
well without the imposition of liability upon architects and engineers
who design, but do not build, structures and other facilities. I see
no justification for extending the common law to place liability on
architects.
3 2
Perhaps the justification lies in the severe injuries possible by not
specifying shoring in a situation where extreme bodily injury is reason-
ably foreseeable and workmen's compensation may be inadequate. In
this case the defendants engineer admitted that no detailed calculations
of the loads, which were to be placed on the shoring, were made specifi-
cally, that no method was recommended, and in fact that there was not
a representative of the firm at the site while this part of the operation
was underway.
Under these circumstances, the majority view seems to be the equi-
table position. To allow architects and engineers to escape liability, when
they are the very persons to whom contractors look to for approval be-
cause of their superior technical knowledge, would leave the construc-
tion worker and innocent bystanders at the discretion of contractors, who
although concerned with safety, are also motivated by economics and
completion dates.
Negligence-Primary Basis of Liability
Prior to the decisions in the Broyles33 case and the Miller 34 case and,
still in many jurisdictions today, the engineer has been held liable for
negligence only. The often cited 35 case for the definition of the duty
owed by the engineer is Cowles v. City of Minneapolis.36 Cowles sought
to collect his fee for engineering services and the City refused payment
on the grounds that that which was contracted for, had not been
32 Id. at 643.
33 Supra n. 21.
34 Supra n. 26.
35 Prosser, Law of Torts, 164 (3rd ed. 1964); Bell, op. cit. supra n. 20; Pastorelli v.
Associated Engineers, 176 F. Supp. 159 (D.C., R.I. 1959).
36 128 Minn. 452, 151 N.W. 184 (1915).
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achieved. The Court found that Cowles performed his duties without
negligence and awarded payment of his fee. In the opinion the Court
defines the duty37 as follows:
The plaintiff was an engineer and was employed as such. In per-
forming the work which he undertook, it was his duty to exercise
such care, skill and diligence as men engaged in that profession
ordinarily exercise under like circumstances. He was not an insurer
that the contractor would perform his work properly in all respects,
but, it was his duty to exercise reasonable care to see that they did
so.
38
Some of the few instances in which engineers have been held liable
for negligence are in the following general areas: design and materials,39
supervision,40 cost estimating,4 ' and approval of progress payments.42
The engineers in Scott v. Potomac Insurance Company43 were held ac-
countable for neglecting to compensate for the difference in expansion
coefficients when they substituted a special iron pipe for the originally
planned copper piping. In Bloomsburg Mills v. Sandoni44 the engineer
specified an insulating material which proved to be inadequate for the
special application. Faulty designs, such as forgetting to specify railings
on balconies and porches has caused litigation involving engineers. 45
There are two areas of liability associated with construction cost in
which the engineer is active and can be held liable for his errors. The
first is the negligent approval of progress payments to a building con-
tractor. In Correy v. Eastman46 the architect negligently gave his ap-
proval for a progress payment for work not yet performed. The con-
tractor subsequently went bankrupt and the court allowed the owner to
recover from the architect. An associated area of liability is that of
negligently estimating the initial cost of structures or projects. 47
37 For a definition of the architect's duty see, Bayshore Development Co. v. Bonfoey,
75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918).
38 Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, supra n. 36.
39 Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sandoni Const. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 164 A. 2d 201 (1960);
Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co. of D.C., 217 Or. 323, 341 P. 2d 1083 (1959).
40 Pastorelli v. Associated Engineers, supra n. 35, Miller et al. v. DeWitt et al., supra
n. 26.
41 Beachman v. Greenville County, 218 S.C. 181, 62 S.E. 2d 92 (1950); Laning v.
School District, 190 Or. 358, 224 P. 2d 923 (1950); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70, 104 A.
2d 54 (1954); Capital Hotel Co. v. Rittenberry, 41 S.W. 2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
42 Corey v. Eastman, 166 Mass. 279, 44 N.E. 217 (1896); Bump v. McGrannahan, 61
Ind. App. 136, 111 N.E. 640 (1916).
4 3 Supra n. 39.
44 Supra n. 39.
45 Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 164 N.Y. 2d 699, 143 N.E. 2d 896 (1957);
Montijo v. Swift, 219 C.A. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
46 Supra n. 42.
47 Supra n. 41.
Jan. 1970
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The area of supervision may, as indicated in Miller v. DeWitt,"
cause much litigation in the future, since the engineer or architect is
generally retained to supervise the construction activity. In Pastorelli v.
Associated Engineers,49 a heating duct fell from the ceiling fifteen months
after the work was completed and turned over to the owner. The de-
fendant engineer's negligence was based upon the fact that he did not
witness or make an inspection of the attaching of the duct work.
One of the defenses made by the engineer is the plea of acceptance
of the engineering plans by the owner 5° or a responsible corporate
officer.51 In neither of the above two instances was the plea successful.
In dismissing the "acceptance of plans" argument in Bloomsburg Mills
v. Sandoni52 the court said:
. . . the fact that a responsible officer of the plaintiff corporation ap-
proved the plans did not excuse the defendants from the exercise
of ordinary and reasonable skill in providing plans that were ade-
quate. 53
The passage of extended periods of time54 and the lack of privity of
contract 55 have been equally unsuccessful as defenses against engineer-
ing error. The rationale for not accepting privity of contract or the ac-
ceptance of the building or structure by the owner, is that third party
rights should not be subject to the agreement between the engineer and
owner.
56
As pointed out earlier in this article, a substantial number of en-
gineers, both licensed and unlicensed, are employed by corporations.
Although this group is not engaged in the construction of buildings,
bridges, or highways, their work affects the public health and safety5 7
as much, if not more than their licensed colleagues in the consulting
engineering business.
Corporate engineers are becoming concerned with the growing field
of product liability which began with MacPherson v. Buick.5 8 Examples
48 Supra n. 26.
49 Supra n. 35.
50 Supra n. 45.
51 Supra n. 39.
52 Ibid.
53 Id. at 203.
54 Hale v. DePoali, 33 Cal. 2d 288, 201 P. 2d 1 (1948).
55 Supra n. 45.
56 Bell, op. cit. supra n. 20.
57 Licensing statutes are based upon the right of the state to specify laws for the
protection of their citizens. For cases holding these statutes constitutional see: People
ex rel. Laist v. Lower, 251 Ill. 527, 96 N.E. 346 (1911); Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal.
331, 90 P. 702 (1907); Burke v. Memphis, 94 Tenn. 692, 30 S.W. 742 (1895).
58 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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of this concern are the increasing number of articles published in engi-
neering periodicals.59
In an excerpt from one of the articles"° the following question is
posed: "Will the engineering designer in the future be personally liable
for a design that causes injury or loss? Some authorities including some
insurance companies, think this is a possibility. At least one company
thinks it will be writing malpractice insurance for engineers, including
those employed by manufacturers, in the foreseeable future. One author-
ity in the field predicts that at least some insurers will soon be inserting
clauses in product liability policies that eliminate coverage of product
design itself."
Chances are, however, that most of the corporate engineers will be
shielded from liability. One prominent Ohio attorney, noted for his work
in the products design liability area, points out, "the corporate structure
of marketing, manufacturing, and engineering often dictate what the
ultimate design will be, thereby removing authority and responsibility
from the design engineer. In addition to this there is the problem of
collectability, the usually solvent corporations and the questionable
engineer." I1
Conclusions
Although the chances of individual corporate engineers being held
liable for faulty products is slight, the forces at work in the product
liability area should bring about some long needed changes. Not the
least of these changes should be a requirement that corporate engineers,
or at a minimum their responsible supervisors or directors, obtain a pro-
fessional engineering license.
The present decision making structure of corporations concerning
both new and existing products will probably undergo subtle and infor-
mal changes. The manager of the engineering section will soon tire of
testifying in product liability cases concerned with faulty designs which
were substantially altered by the marketing or manufacturing functions.
He should also become equally tired of the distorted advertising on prod-
ucts he has designed.
The corporate engineer is presently being called upon as the indi-
vidual responsible for the product; his main problem is that he does not
59 The following series of articles are published in Product Engineering, published
by McGraw Hill: Kolb, The Price of Faulty Design Gets Steeper Everyday, 37 Prod-
uct Eng. 34 (Aug. 1, 1966); Design For Safety, 36 Product Eng. 123 (Sept. 13, 1965);
Just How Safe Are You, 36 Product Eng. 68 (Aug. 16, 1965); Explosion-Proof Design,
36 Product Eng. 68 (Feb. 1, 1965); Let The Manufacturer Beware, 34 Product Eng. 99
(Dec. 9, 1963).
60 Kolb, supra n. 59, at 39.
61 Quote from interview of Craig Spangenberg, Esq. (of Cleveland) by the author,
January, 1969.
Jan. 1970
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have the accompanying authority or control over the product. As time
goes on, it is very likely that the necessary authority and control will be
placed with the engineer so that he can take steps to stem the tide of
consumer injury.
Unlike his colleague the corporate engineer, the consultant engi-
neer's individual legal status is presently undergoing changes as evi-
denced by the decisions in the Broyles 62 and the Miller 63 cases. The
reasoning in both cases is sound and should be adopted by many juris-
dictions.
The reasoning of the Miller 64 case was such that the individual with
supervisory authority including the authority to stop the work should
be legally responsible for injury caused by his failure to specify and
supervise. In view of the consultant engineer's expertise in the construc-
tion field, it seems only proper that he be held legally responsible for
injuries he could have prevented.
The Broyles6 5 case was based on the implied warranty of the engi-
neering plans (i.e. the engineering services) to accomplish the specified
result. As the instruments and background knowledge of the engineer-
ing world continue to develop, the unknown and uncontrollable factors
involved in engineering projects decrease proportionately. With this de-
crease, the courts should increase the engineer's liability based upon the
success or failure of the engineering project, the fruits of the engineer's
services.
62 Supra n. 21.
63 Supra n. 26.
64 Ibid.
65 Supra n. 21.
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